{"id":64109,"date":"2019-08-11t12:00:30","date_gmt":"2019-08-11t16:00:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/48e130086c.nxcli.net\/?p=64109"},"modified":"2024-08-14t09:35:02","modified_gmt":"2024-08-14t13:35:02","slug":"who-decides-what-to-pay-partners","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"\/\/www.g005e.com\/2019\/08\/11\/who-decides-what-to-pay-partners\/","title":{"rendered":"the partner comp battleground"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>who decides and how, including setting and monitoring goals. by tommye barie previously we reviewed the goal-setting process, introduced how the managing partner should orchestrate the partner goal-setting process and discussed why the goals should be based on normal expectations of any partner rather than on the exceptional performance of a specific partner. now let’s discuss who is in charge of what parts of the compensation-setting process and more.<\/p>\n more:<\/strong> if you don\u2019t eat what you kill, what do you eat?<\/a> | 3 ways to emphasize the one-firm concept<\/a> | 8 steps for a successful change process<\/a> | building competency on every level<\/a> | change happens: how to master it.<\/a> who\u2019s in charge of what parts of compensation?<\/strong><\/p>\n once the decision has been made to implement systemic changes to hold partners accountable to specific performance expectations rather just relying on everyone to put in a self-proclaimed \u201cgood day\u2019s work,\u201d the next battleground is how compensation is determined and who is responsible for which parts of the process.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n as we have said in the previous columns, everyone likes the idea that \u201ci\u201d will hold \u201cme\u201d accountable. but few like the idea of \u201canyone else\u201d holding \u201cthem\u201d accountable. so, the discussion always shifts to \u201clet\u2019s have a group of people, such as a compensation committee, hold us accountable.\u201d the reason is simple: if i get crossways with one person (or i ignore the direction from one person who is holding me accountable), i will pay a penalty for that action. as i add more people to the evaluation process, it is easier to find a friend or an ally who will be willing to overlook my infractions and fight for my benefit.<\/p>\n just for the record, anytime we hear that performance assessment will be a group function, if we had a loud aggravating buzzer, we would be sure to set it off non-stop until a new idea emerges.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n as we’ve said before, the managing partner should be solely responsible for the goal-setting process for partners and the allocation of the performance pay based on individual partner goal achievement. but there is more to compensation than just performance pay, especially because most of a partner\u2019s compensation isn\u2019t performance pay, so let\u2019s take a look at where it is logical for a compensation committee to come into play.<\/p>\n certain pay-related functions in many firms could fit well under a compensation committee. it is not a question of whether you should have a compensation committee; but rather it is more the question of its charge.<\/p>\n first, remember that a compensation committee, if formed, is a committee of the board of directors (or board of partners, etc.). it is not a committee that has unique dictatorial authority. what confuses this sometimes is that many firms\u2019 compensation committees are made up of partners who collectively have enough voting power on the board to make their recommendation, and then vote in whatever they recommended. but these are two separate functions that simply look like one. when functioning properly, the compensation committee normally makes a compensation recommendation at the beginning of each year. the board then modifies, rejects or accepts that recommendation to finalize it.<\/p>\n in our opinion, compensation committees should be charged with:<\/p>\n notice that the compensation committee does the heavy lifting at the beginning of the year when determining base\/guaranteed pay along with any firmwide expectations as they develop the compensation framework. the managing partner does the heavy lifting at the end of the year by individually making the final evaluation regarding goal accomplishment at that time.<\/p>\n in the end, both groups should have their final recommendations approved by the board, with the board only looking at the proposals for fatal flaws. without at least minimal oversight of the compensation committee or managing partner regarding the compensation process, it would be easy to place too much power in the hands of a very few who could end up using that power for personal gain. for example, we have been brought into many firms that have granted too much power to either the compensation committee or the managing partner where that power was used inappropriately and sometimes unethically to threaten severe compensation adjustments if a partner or partners wouldn\u2019t support some specific, self-serving position from someone from one of these two functions.<\/p>\n now, it would be easy to conclude that what we just covered above muddies the water and that there is more overlap than should be between the roles of the compensation committee and the managing partner. hopefully, the following will provide some added clarity on this topic. the general compensation framework guides all partners. some firms have specific, objective metrics (in addition to individualized goals set by the managing partner) that apply to all partners that are merely calculations as they are not based on observation, communication, interactions, etc. for example, many firms will have a minimum number of charge hours (we recommend that client service partners fall somewhere between 900 and 1,100 and technical partners between 1,100 and 1,300). other examples might be completing timesheets timely or that their billings and collections are conducted in line with firm policy. these kinds of expectations are considered minimum requirements to living up to the role of being a partner, with some of them having specific, identified financial consequences, which can be fairly assessed based on data provided by administrative personnel to a compensation committee.<\/p>\n many firms don\u2019t have this second layer of objective metrics for partner performance \u2013 they only have individualized goals and base or guaranteed pay. if this is the case for your firm, then the compensation committee should really only focus on developing the compensation framework and recommending annual pay adjustments. but if you have a second layer of objective metrics, then consider that base or guaranteed pay is earned by meeting these minimum objectives as a partner, and when partners underperform in these areas, that is cause for the compensation committee to consider an overall pay adjustment in the following years.<\/p>\n an individualized goal process driven by the managing partner would sit on top of base pay and meeting any firmwide expectations. this is because each partner has strengths and weaknesses, and each partner has different responsibilities and job duties that will impact the firm\u2019s ability to achieve its strategic plan. therefore, it is appropriate to assign a customizable set of goals to each partner based on:<\/p>\n for this, management by committee \u2013 the compensation committee \u2013 is a bad idea. why? the most significant and success-driving job of the managing partner is to manage the partners. if he or she directs a partner to accomplish something specific or change a behavior or attitude, without a material compensation \u201cstick\u201d to reward achievement or punish failure, there is virtually no way for the managing partner to consistently hold the directed partner accountable.<\/p>\n the most common argument posed here is that the managing partner can work through the compensation committee to effect the same outcome. there are situations in which this might work \u2026 not because the system is designed to work, but because the specific people on the compensation committee and the managing partner have such respect for each other that they can overcome the dysfunction of the system in place.<\/p>\n it is essential for the sustainable success of firms to put governance systems in place designed to work effectively, regardless of who occupies the various roles, rather than to build systems around specific people that quickly fail when there is a shift in talent filling those roles. to put this in very clear terms:<\/p>\n the managing partner needs a compensation stick under which he or she has final authority to determine the achievement level for each partner regarding the specific individualized goals set for each partner.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n please recognize the difference between governance rights and privileges, and common sense. for example, a managing partner should:<\/p>\n the managing partner\u2019s job is to help every partner achieve his\/her goals, not just sit in judgment of them. when a managing partner is not following common-sense values and objectives such as those outlined above, it does not mean that you should dilute the power of the managing partner\u2019s position. do not turn over the powers a managing partner requires to be effective to a compensation committee just because you have an incompetent managing partner. rather, elect a new managing partner who will do the job as outlined.<\/p>\n it is one thing for a compensation committee to evaluate performance regarding objective criteria \u2013 those metrics that are approved as part of the overall compensation plan each year that require no interaction or conversation with the partner to assess performance. it is entirely another to have a compensation committee assess a partner\u2019s individual performance against customized goals that often have some qualitative (subjective) aspect to them, if not being entirely qualitative in nature. it is not the job of the compensation committee to meet with any partner and assess progress. that function belongs solely to the managing partner. it is not the job of the compensation committee to regularly coach partners in behavior and developmental transitions; once again, that function also belongs to the managing partner.<\/p>\n performance pay for the managing partner\u2019s allocation<\/strong><\/p>\n based on the above, you can see why we believe it is clearly not the job of the compensation committee to control all performance funding. this is because some amount needs to be reserved for the managing partner to make clear that his\/her assessment of individual performance throughout the year has enough meaning for partners to pay attention to those communications. and it also follows that a reasonable amount of performance pay should be earmarked and reserved for goal accomplishment in order to motivate partners to want to achieve them.<\/p>\n the common amount we suggest is 20 percent of total expected pay. some firms start off with 10 percent, with an agreed-to increase to 15 percent a year or two later, and then eventually migrating to 20 percent (with some evolving to even higher amounts). the problem with 10 to 15 percent is that if a partner has four or five goals, by the time you spread that amount across them, the amount for accomplishment of a specific goal or two has been so small that we have heard partners say, \u201cfor $5,000, i will just contribute that money to the firm and keep doing what i have always done. there isn\u2019t enough money at stake to make me care about changing the way i work.\u201d<\/p>\n the problem is that most firms are against a 20 percent contingent portion of pay reserved for the managing partner, with some resistant to holding back even a 10 percent reserve. those same firms are almost always struggling with silo operations and common rogue partner behaviors, coupled with partners who pick and choose the parts of the partner role they want to live up to rather than be held to fill the entire role of partner.<\/p>\n there are two predominant reasons why partners struggle with reserving compensation for the goal-setting process.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n the first and foremost is that someone in the past, usually a previous managing partner, had too much control over owner compensation \u2013 all compensation \u2013 and that power was perceived to be abused. for this reason, partner groups fight the idea of going back to a system that includes any discretionary components. however, as a side note, when all of the metrics are objective, we tend to find partners dramatically manipulating the system for their own benefit, with little to no way for the firm to align partner behavior with the strategic plan or to agreed-to operational change.<\/p>\n to be doubly clear here, nothing we have written above is advocating that the managing partner have control over all of the compensation. we believe that would be an example of excess power for that position. but we do believe that because the job of the managing partner is to manage the partners, he\/she should have some kind of compensation stick to hold each partner accountable to their individualized goals, which should be tied to the strategic plan.<\/p>\n the second reason most firms don\u2019t like this type of system is that partners simply don\u2019t want anyone telling them what to do. you might say it is the \u201cso who died and crowned you king?\u201d perspective. most partners believe that because they have proven themselves over 10 to 20 years of performance before being named a partner, they have earned the right to do things their way and people need to trust that the choices they are making are for the best for the firm.<\/p>\n the problem is that this perspective is riddled with flaws. for example, while we would agree that partners generally prove themselves over long periods of time through their performance, during all of that time, someone or some group was managing them. so why, just because an individual is named a partner, should they move from a managed environment to one with total autonomy? that doesn\u2019t make sense. if we have 20 years of good performance being managed, why would we stop doing something that has been working so well?<\/p>\n another flaw is the assumption that partners will make the best use of the resources of the firm. commonly found compensation systems prove that idea wrong all of the time. for example, assume that a partner compensation system focuses on only two common variables for cpa firms: 1) book of business and 2) personal charge hours. now consider that a partner has an opportunity to bring in new clients, although the work is at a very marginal rate. this work, from the firm\u2019s perspective, will tie up scarce resources and provide minimal profitability, if any. from the perspective of the partner bringing in the work, he or she will have increased the size of their book of business, which is one of the two performance metrics. clearly, in this example, the partner would be motivated to accept work that is not in the best interest of the firm. (just fyi, we know we could easily remedy this specific situation with a formal client acceptance process but we could spend another 10 pages walking through common inappropriate book management manipulations so we just covered a very basic example.)<\/p>\n another common scenario pertains to charge hours. when a partner is compensated for charge hours, whatever charge hours they can muster, he or she is being motivated to increase chargeable work personally that others might be able to do and avoid other work that only a partner can do. so, consider that a partner has work queued up that he or she is about to do. and in this case, let\u2019s also assume that one of the managers or supervisors, who also has the skills to do that work, has capacity and could work on that project instead of sitting idle.<\/p>\n when partners, in cases such as these, are paid for every charge hour they can bill, they will be motivated to do the work themselves in order to enhance their pay.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n so, instead of doing the right thing, in our view, of always passing down the work to the lowest possible levels to create leverage and free up partner time, they will choose to misuse firm resources. the compensation system in this scenario is motivating the partners to make the wrong decision \u2013 to ignore idle resources and do the work themselves rather than passing the work down and freeing up time to do those tasks or functions that only partners can do.<\/p>\n conclusion of the goal process: monitoring<\/strong><\/p>\n evaluation of performance and goal achievement is something that should be performed multiple times during the year. unfortunately, many cpas tend to think of management as a waste of time, and evaluations as purely a human resources (hr) requirement created by the government to protect employees to the disadvantage of the organization.<\/p>\n well, that is one way to look at it. but we think it\u2019s the wrong way. we think that the higher you rise in your firm\u2019s organizational chart, the more time you need to dedicate to developing others and providing them with thoughtful and constructive feedback. so, this is not something you should be doing for five minutes every few months, but a normal, recurring part of every work week. that is, you should be thinking about and monitoring those who report to you, as well as monitoring your own progress and checking in with your boss routinely.<\/p>\n while it is normal protocol to monitor those who report to you, why would we suggest that you monitor yourself as well? because it is your job, as management, to provide appropriate feedback and coaching to your people; and it is your job as a direct report to keep your boss informed about progress, resource requirements and problems as you tackle your own work assignments.<\/p>\n if we approach this phase from an hr perspective, many partners will default to giving one appraisal per year (or one formal feedback session), and that simply is not enough. it could be enough to have one formal appraisal or feedback session as long as there are several informal feedback sessions (clearly set up for that purpose) in the interim. for higher-level personnel, the importance of making sure they are focusing on the priorities of the organization and working toward the organization\u2019s goals is critical. the absurd thing is that in most companies, the lower the hierarchical level of the employee, the more often the feedback is given. but at the higher levels in the organization, the more we find people talking about expectations, but never actually holding anyone accountable to their commitments or their actions.<\/p>\n the misguided theory behind this is simple. when you are a lower level of employee, you don\u2019t know anything. so, we need to regularly tell you how you are falling short of expectations so you will try harder. with higher-level people, because they have already proven themselves, we just need to get out of their way.<\/p>\n in our opinion, everyone needs frequent feedback, from top to bottom. we suggest this not because we are trying to manipulate people into working harder, but rather, we want everyone\u2019s efforts to be focused on doing whatever is best for the firm or making the personal changes required for them to be more effective in the future.<\/p>\n if we can get our top performers and key people acting as a group supporting the firm, then getting everyone else at each layer down in the organizational chart to respond accordingly gets much easier.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n however, with most firms, they focus on making the lowest levels accountable first when the fact is that the higher-level people in the firm keep mucking up the system. every leadership and management book will have some statement that the top people in any organization need to \u201cwalk the walk\u201d for the talk they talk. that is all accountability is \u2013 walking the talk \u2013 setting the example that you want others to follow.<\/p>\n therefore, it should not be surprising that we believe the managing partner should be conducting frequent, informal feedback sessions on how he\/she feels each partner is performing, whether this is every month, every other month, five or six scheduled times a year dropping out the busiest of deadline months, or whatever schedule works for your firm. once a quarter should be a minimum, once again, adjusting the timing for busy seasons. but to be clear, this isn\u2019t about an hr function, but rather about aligning the scarce resources of the most powerful and talented assets you have in your business.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" who decides and how, including setting and monitoring goals.<\/strong>
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\nby bill reeb<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3381,"featured_media":41759,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_relevanssi_hide_post":"","_relevanssi_hide_content":"","_relevanssi_pin_for_all":"","_relevanssi_pin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_unpin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_include_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_exclude_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_no_append":"","_relevanssi_related_not_related":"","_relevanssi_related_posts":"","_relevanssi_noindex_reason":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1363,2374,3120,3002,2266],"tags":[2429,572,38,1416],"class_list":["post-64109","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-featured","category-pay-compensation","category-pro-member-exclusive","category-special","category-partner","tag-earnings","tag-pay","tag-salary","tag-wages"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n